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Abstract—It is well known that distributed control can improve
the resiliency of DC microgrids against multiple link failures as
compared to centralized control. However, the control layer is
still vulnerable to cyber attacks. Unlike widely studied false data
injection attacks (FDIAs), which involve adding false signals on
top of existing ones in the controller or communication links,
hijacking attacks completely replace the existing signals. As
a result, the compromised agent(s) diverge from steady state
owing to imbalance in the iterative rule of consensus algorithm.
To detect hijacking attacks, a novel distributed screening (DS)
methodology is proposed. In addition to that, a fault detection
(FD) metric is provided to assist the proposed attack detection
strategy in differentiating between hijacking attacks and sensor
faults. This reduces the complexity of decision making in the
attack mitigation approach. Further, interoperability of the pro-
posed detection metrics allows simultaneous detection of sensor
faults and hijacking attacks. The performance of the proposed
detection metrics is evaluated under simulation and experimental
conditions to conclude that it successfully detects the attacked
agent(s) as well as sensor fault(s).
Index Terms—DC microgrid, cyber attack detection, dis-
tributed control.
I. INTRODUCTION
D ISTRIBUTED control of DC microgrids offers a reliable,flexible and economic alternative to centralized approach
[1]. It provides resiliency from single-point-of-failure and
operating flexibility with plug-and-play capability [2]. This
philosophy has been extensively adopted for many purposes,
such as energy balancing and current sharing solely using local
and neighboring measurements [3]-[4]. Albeit its operational
advantages, integration of communication and automation
technologies increase the vulnerability of microgrids to cyber
attacks [5]. These vulnerabilities allow potential adversaries to
create unfavorable scenarios, which may lead to uneconomic
operation, instability or system shutdown. This is a thriving
concern for microgrid system operators, as the recent advance-
ments in control and monitoring systems are exposed to such
vulnerabilities [6]-[7].
Many prevention mechanisms, such as, cryptography, au-
thentication and access control processes have been designed
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Fig. 1. Key vulnerable sections in industrial cyber-physical microgrids with
security mechanisms - Control layer could be highly vulnerable to cyber
intrusions via malware, if the regular host security updates go missing.
to avoid facing any interruptions. Particularly for information
exchange in the cyber layer, many encryption based security
mechanisms are devised for the cyber layer. Further in the
physical layer, the sensors are usually hard wired to ensure
security. However, these efforts are still limited with regard to
platform and communication security [8]-[9]. As shown in Fig.
1, the biggest security concern in industrial microgrids is often
faced in the control layer instead of the cyber-physical layer
[10]. As per many cybersecurity experts, malware intrusion
into the host (as shown in Fig. 1) can be classified as a broad
class of attack to compromise the system [11]. They can easily
jeopardize operation of mission-critical autonomous systems
such as, naval ships and submarines by malware propagating
websites or tainted files. These elements often bypass the host
security mechanism due to missing uninstalled updates in the
host. Recently, a denial-of-service bug was found in the in-
flight entertainment, which affected the critical flight systems
[12]. According to the 2011 annual report of the Repository for
Industrial Security Incidents (RISI), around 35% of industrial
control system (ICS) security incidents were instigated through
remote access of the host [13]. Hence, this necessitates the
need to protect microgrids from hijacking attacks from a
control design perspective.
From the control perspective, cyber attacks in microgrids
are studied for covert [14], replay attacks [15], and attacks
on energy management systems [16]. Further, the impact of
the most prominent cyber attack in microgrids, i.e. the false
data injection attack (FDIA) is extensively studied in [21]-
[22]. Such attacks, when formulated in a sophisticated way
to hide their presence from state observers, are termed as
stealth attacks [23]. They are capable of disrupting the network
stability and control structures deceitfully. A distinguishing
feature of FDIAs is that they only add a false value on top
of existing measurement signals. With regards to distributed
control theory, asymptotic convergence to reach consensus is
still possible, even though the final value may be incorrect.
On the other hand, a separate class of intrusion approach,
namely a hijacking attack, interrupts the update process of
the consensus algorithm by completely replacing the existing
signal with an exogenous input [24]. The impact of such
attacks, alternatively referred to as random attacks, have been
extensively studied in [25]-[26], where it was shown that they
can deter the optimal performance of the microgrid. Since it
replaces the time-stamped measurement with a constant input,
the linear consensus algorithm fails to update its reference state
with respect to its neighboring agents, ultimately resulting in
inevitable power imbalance. Moreover, it is difficult to detect
the attacked agent under such conditions since a disruption in
consensus theory causes all the agents to misbehave simultane-
ously. Hence, detection of hijacking attacks in DC microgrids
becomes more challenging than FDIAs.
Interestingly, some papers have addressed this problem also
when agents have simply crashed or have sensor faults [27]-
[28]. Hence, prior focus should be provided on accurate de-
tection of hijacking attacks alongwith differentiation between
cyber attack and sensor faults, especially when the misbe-
having agents have malicious intent rather than simply being
subjected to faults. Any sensor fault, which is usually caused
by an interruption in the sensor-controller network, can disrupt
the operation of agent(s) in DC microgrids, thereby reducing
their reliability and operational efficiency. Such faults can be
easily recovered by using state observers [30]. However, sensor
faults also cause an interruption in the update of consensus
law, thereby leading to maloperating events. As a result, a
key indicator needs to be designed to differentiate between
hijacking attacks and sensor faults in distributed control based
DC microgrids.
To address this issue, this paper proposes a distributed
screening (DS) based metric for each agent. This metric is
calculated using local and neighboring input current refer-
ences of DC/DC converters, which remain in consensus for a
particular global voltage reference under no attack. However,
during an attack, distributed screening metric of attacked agent
does not obey consensus theory, which becomes the basis of
determining the attacked agent. Further, its performance is
assisted by a sensor failure detection (FD) metric which has
been designed to detect sensor faults. As a result, the proposed
framework avoids confusion, and allows interoperability of
all the proposed detection criterias. Finally, the performance
of proposed detection metric is assessed when agents are
subjected to single/multiple attacks under plug in-and-out of
agents, communication delay and sensor faults under simula-
tion and experimental conditions to validate its robustness in
distributed DC microgrids. These security mechanisms can be
a key asset in real applications in autonomous systems such
as, electric ships and aircrafts, telecommunication centres and
renewable energy based systems.
Fig. 2. Generic cyber-physical model of a DC microgrid with N agents
operating to achieve average voltage regulation and proportionate current
sharing: Blue arrows represent the cyber layer while black lines represent
the physical circuit.
II. CONVENTIONAL DISTRIBUTED CONTROL STRATEGY
IN DC MICROGRIDS
A. Cyber-Physical Preliminaries
An autonomous DC microgrid considered in this work
is shown in Fig. 2. N DC sources connected via DC/DC
converters of equal power rating are interconnected to each
other via tie-lines forming the physical layer of the microgrid.
The DC/DC converters are operated in voltage controlled
mode. Droop control philosophy ensures current sharing by
imposing voltage offset error. To compensate for this offset
and for line impedance mismatch, secondary controllers are
deployed [4]. As shown in Fig. 2, the measurements from
neighbors are transmitted between each other, and are used in
achieving consensus to regulate average voltage and current
sharing in the microgrid. In the cyber layer, an undirected
graph is considered, where vertices denote the points of
connections of physical sources (DC/DC converters). Each
agent is represented by a node and a communication digraph
by edges using an adjacency matrix A = [aij ] ε RN×N . The
communication weights are given by:
aij =
{
> 0, if (ψi, ψj) ε E
0, else
where E is an edge connecting two nodes, with ψi and ψj
being the local and neighboring node respectively. Each vertex
sends and receives xj = [V̄dcj , I
pu
dcj
] from its neighboring ver-
tices to achieve the secondary control objectives highlighted in
Fig. 2, where V̄dcj and I
pu
dcj
denote the average voltage estimate
and per unit output current of the neighboring agents. On the
other hand, xi = [V̄dci , I
pu
dci
] denote the local measurements
in ith agent. Using the cyber graph, the local input can be
written as:
ui =
∑
i∈Mi
aij(xj − xi) (1)
where ui = [uVi , u
I
i ] corresponds to the elements in xi
respectively and Mi denotes the set of neighbors of ith
agent. Mathematically, the incoming information matrix can
be denoted by Zin =
∑
i ε N aij . Hence, if both matrices
match each other, the Laplacian matrix L is balanced, where
L = Zin − A and its elements are given by:
lij =

deg(ni) , i = j
−1 , i 6= j
0 , otherwise
(2)
where deg(ni) is the degree of ith agent.
To establish the highlighted objectives in Fig. 2 for DC/DC
converters operating to maintain the output voltage, two volt-
age correction terms for ith agent are calculated using:
∆V1i = H1(s) (Vdcref − uVi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
eVi
(3)
∆V2i = H2(s) (Idcref − uIi )︸ ︷︷ ︸
eIi
(4)
where H1(s) = KH1P +
K
H1
I
s , H2(s) = K
H2
P +
K
H2
I
s are
PI controllers and Vdcref and Idcref are the global reference
voltage and current quantities of all the agents, respectively.
It should be noted that Idcref = 0 for proportionate current
sharing between the agents.
Remark I: As per the synchronization law [31], all the agents
participating in distributed control will achieve consensus
using ẋ = −Lx for a well-spanned symmetric Laplacian
matrix L such that lim
t→∞
xi(t) = c, ∀i ε N , where c = [Vdcref ,
Idcref ].
The voltage correction terms obtained in (3)-(4) are finally
added to the global reference voltage Vdcref setpoint to achieve
local voltage references for ith agent using:
V idcref = Vdcref + ∆V1i + ∆V2i . (5)
Using (5) as the local voltage reference for ith agent, the sec-
ondary objectives highlighted in Fig. 2 is achieved. According
to the distributed consensus algorithm for a well connected
cyber graph in a DC microgrid, the system objectives for DC
microgrids using (1)-(5) shall converge to:
lim
t→∞
V̄dci(t) = Vdcref , limt→∞
uIi (t) = 0 ∀i ε N (6)
where
V̄dci(t) = Vdci(t) +
∫
jεMi
uVi (t) (7)
with Vdci denoting the output voltage of i
th agent.
B. Modeling of Hijacking Attacks
Upon hijacking the communicated current measurement(s)
in the controller, the communicated current signals received at
ith agent is modified to:
Iadcj (t) = (1− α)Idcj (t) + αx
a
j (8)
where Iadcj and x
a
j denote the final value of current mea-
surement from the neighboring agent and a constant attack
element, respectively. Moreover, α is a binary variable to
represent the presence of any attack elements, with α = 1
implying that the system is attacked or 0, otherwise. As a
result, the consensus theory misbehaves thereby restricting
Iadcj (t) to update with further iterations. This instills arbitrary
steady-state current values for each agent, which do not obey
the consensus theory. On the other hand, FDIAs in the output
currents of neighboring agents can be modeled as:
Iadcj (t) = Idcj (t) + αx
a
j . (9)
Therefore, as opposed to (8), it is clear that (9) allow updates
of the transmitted signal since the attacked signal is still
dependent on a time-varying variable Idcj (t). As a result,
it leads to asymptotic convergence, albeit the value may be
wrong.
Fig. 3. Performance of cooperative agents in DC microgrid in the presence
of asymmetric hijacking attack – The system objectives in (6) are violated
leading to steady divergence of voltages.
The system behavior under hijacking attack is shown in
Fig. 3 for a cyber-physical DC microgrid comprising of N=
4 agents, where agent III is attacked using (8) at t = 1
s. This attack leads to steady increase of voltages, which
will ultimately lead to activation of protective system and a
blackout of the whole microgrid. The protection measures for
each converter will operate as soon as the following holds true:
Vdcmini < Vdci < Vdcmaxi (10)
Idcmini < Idci < Idcmaxi (11)
where Idcmini , Idcmaxi , Vdcmini and Vdcmaxi denote the min-
imum and maximum threshold for output current, minimum
and maximum threshold for voltages of ith agent. Eq. (8) can
be termed as an asymmetric hijacking attack, since the data
intrusion only into communicated measurements creates an
asymmetrical drift of the states with respect to the Laplacian
graph [31], such that ẋa + Lxa 6= 0.
C. Differentiation with FDIAs
From an operational point of view, a FDI attack can be
defined as an attack which adds an exogeneous input to the
consensus update in (9) with every iteration. As a result,
the consensus in the following iterations for (1) may update
to a feasible value, if the states are operating within the
bounds. For example, a FDI attack of xa1 = 3 at t = 5 s
in Fig. 4(a) causes every agent to converge to a feasible
but biased value of 2. Further when an actual signal x2 is
increased by 4 at t = 15 s, the rest of the states iterate to a
new value maintaining consensus theory. On the other hand,
hijacking attacks for the same system impair the update rule
(a) Convergence in the presence of FDIAs.
(b) Convergence in the presence of hijacking
attacks.
Fig. 4. Comparative performance evaluation of (1) under FDIAs and hijacking
attacks - Hijacking attacks interrupt the iterative consensus theory; thereby
resulting in an arbitrary performance.
in (1), thereby making it behave arbitatrily. This is carried
out by replacing the measured signal with a constant attack
signal, which then serves as a reference for other agents.
Consequently, the attacked agent(s) operate incorrectly leading
to an arbitrary solution. For example, an hijacking attack of
xa1 = 3 is launched at t = 5 s in Fig. 4(b), which causes
the remaining states to slowly converge to the attacked value.
Further for a step increase in x2 by a value of 4 carried out at
t = 15 s, the remaining units still converge to xa1 = 3; thereby
losing the iterative property. In microgrids, this could lead
to several problems such as undervoltage, since such attacks
prohibit dynamics of external disturbances. It should be clearly
noted that the abovementioned attacks can be launched on xi
= [V̄dci , I
pu
dci
] in (1).
Remark II: Under asymmetric hijacking attacks, the system
resorts into a different operating condition as opposed to (6),
which is given by:
lim
t→∞
V̄dci(t) = V
a
dcref
, lim
t→∞
uIi (t) 6= 0 ∀i ε N (12)
where V adcref 6= Vdcref .
On the other hand, a local sensor attack in ith agent is
modeled using
Iadci(t) = (1− α)Idci(t) + αx
a
i (13)
in conjunction with (8) will lead to a symmetric hijacking
attack on ith agent.
Considering ẋa = Lxa, the set of eigenvalues Λs and Λa to
denote the system and attack dynamics respectively, are given
by: {
Λs = {λ1s, λ2s, ..., λNs }
Λa = {λ1a, λ2a, ..., λNa }.
(14)
Accounting marginally stable dynamics as per (6) with the
eigenvalues centred at the origin, a synchronization matrix
Sm(t) can be defined using:
Sm(t) =
N∑
j=1
σ1jx
a
j (t) (15)
where σ1j represent the element of left eigenvector corre-
sponding to the zero eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix L.
Further, σi > 0, if i ∈ R or σi = 0, otherwise.
Remark III: If Sm(t) = 0, symmetric hijacking attack ele-
ments are injected, which does not cause instability and obey
(6).
Using Remark III, it is sufficient to establish that Sm(t) > 0
will only hold true for asymmetric hijacking attacks. Another
forthcoming point is since the system objectives in (6) are
met, the system operator has no information of the presence
of online attack elements. As the adversary wants to cause
shutdown of the microgrid, these online attack elements could
be increased invariably to cause activation of the protection
system leading to system shutdown. Hence, detection strate-
gies to counter both symmetric and asymmetric hijacking
attacks in DC microgrids need to be developed to ensure
system stability and security.
III. PROPOSED DETECTION METRICS FOR HIJACKING
ATTACKS AND SENSOR FAULTS
A. Distributed Screening Detection Metric for Hijacking At-
tacks
Using the modeled attacks in (8) and (13), the dynamic
representation of the cyber attack in ith agent is given by:
χi(t) = Ci
dVdci
dt
= [1−Di(t)]Iini(t)− Iadci(t) (16)
where Iini and Di denote the input current of DC/DC con-
verter and normalized duty ratio in ith agent, respectively.
Denoting (16) in vector form and substituting in (7), we get:
˙̄Vdc + LV̄dc = C−1(NIin − Iadc) (17)
where N = 1− D, Iin, D and Idc denote the diagonal matrices
of Iini , Di and Idci for N agents, respectively. Multiplying
(17) with LT on the left hand side, we obtain:
LT ( ˙̄Vdc + LV̄dc) = LTC−1NIin − LTC−1Iadc. (18)
Using Remark III, (18) will be zero under symmetric attacks
and non-zero under asymmetric attacks. Hence for asymmetric
hijacking attacks, the secondary sublayer II output ramps up,
leading to disorientation of steady-state solutions, as shown
in Fig. 3. Since the attacked current measurement in case of
asymmetric hijacking attack introduces a steady-state error
in (4), the ramped up control output will lead to ramping
up of output voltages at each bus. With steady increase in
the voltages and a constant attacked current signal, output
currents of the non-attacked agents will also increase for
voltage dependent loads. Since the attacked current element
in (8) is constant with every iteration, the attacked agent can
be easily detected by following the disparity of zero gradient of
output current. As per the above-mentioned detection criteria,
it can be concluded that agent III is attacked in Fig. 3.
However, this detection strategy does not accord for sym-
metric hijacking attacks since asymptotic convergence between
every agent is reached. Under steady-state conditions for (5)
accounting a formidable tracking performance by the voltage
controller, we get:
LT∆V1 + LT∆V2 + Vdcref = L
TVdc. (19)
Since the system objectives are met for a symmetric attack,
LT∆V1 = 0 holds true [22]. Using this equality and differ-
entiating (19) with respect to time, we get:
LTH2ėIa − LT V̇dc = 0 (20)
where eIa denote the vector representation of eIi in (4) including
the attack element xa. For symmetric attacks, LTC−1Iadc = 0.
Using this equality after substituting (18) in (20), we get:
LTH2ėIa − LTC
−1NIin = 0. (21)
Remark IV: Since the injected attack elements are constant
in hijacking attacks, differentiation of the attacked quantities
in (13) will translate into an asymmetric matrix in the first
term of (21). As a result, this property will be reflected in the
second term of (21), which becomes the basis of detection for
hijacking attacks.
Considering an apt tracking performance in the current
controller as shown in Fig. 5, a distributed screening factor
DSi for ith agent, as shown in Fig. 5, to detect hijacking
attacks using Remark IV is proposed as follows:
DSi(t) = ci[
∑
jεMi
Ijinref (t)− I
i
inref
(t)]
[
∑
jεMi
Ijinref (t) + I
i
inref
(t)] (22)
where Iiinref is the normalized reference input current obtained
from the outer voltage loop in ith agent. Moreover, ci is a
positive scaling factor, which is used to increase/decrease the
value of DSi. As the cooperative synchronization theory by
secondary sublayer II does not hold true under the presence
of hijacking attacks, it can be deduced that DSi obtained in
(22) will always lead to a positive value greater than ρDSi to
notify presence of any undesired attack element in ith agent. It
is worth notifying that a small detection threshold of ρDSi is
used to avoid the false detection to bypass the unwanted noise
in sensor measurements. To bypass the transients, a dwell
time of 0.5 s is used to affirm detection using steady-state
positive values. A larger value of ρDSi affects the accuracy of
detection and vice-versa. Upon detection, the attack element
can be removed from the attacked agent(s) using a suppression
mechanism, as reported in [32].
On the other hand, the proposed detection approach is also
vulnerable to false indication of cyber attacks during sensor
faults. Any sensor fault could also result in disorientation
of objectives in (6), misleading to positive values of DS in
multiple agents. To prevent this, an evaluation theory to detect
sensor faults has been proposed in the next subsection to assist
(22) in differentiating between hijacking attacks and sensor
fault.
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Fig. 5. Proposed distributed screening based detection controller for ith agent
in DC microgrids.
B. Fault Detection Metric for Sensor Faults
Typically, sensor faults in DC microgrids could arise due
to physical interruption in: 1) the sensor-controller network
owing to loose connections, and 2) disconnection of the
regulated DC power supply into sensing circuit or a fault
in the acquisition channel. This can be easily resolved by
using state observers to estimate the measurement using other
active sensors [29]. As the proposed detection scheme is
designed to identify misbehaving agents in multi-agent based
DC microgrids, it could lead to false detection of hijacking
attacks during sensor faults, which exhibit a similar response.
To avoid complexity in decision-making in implementing
separate countermeasures for cyber attacks and sensor fault,
fault detection FDi metrics are proposed to detect the sensor
faults in ith agent. Since each agent consist of two sensors
{Vdci , Idci}, the corresponding fault detection metrics can
be denoted by {FDiV , FDiI}. The impact on the controller
response due to faults on both sensors has been desribed
below:
1) Current Sensor Fault: A current sensor fault directly
affects the current regulation secondary sublayer in (4). As
soon as the fault occurs in a given agent, the corresponding
current measurement reports zero values to the local controller
as well as the communication links. Referring to (4), this sym-
metric change is cancelled out with respect to the Laplacian
graph theory. Considering a column matrix with faulted current
measurement in N th agent I′dc = [Idc1 ,Idc2 , ...., 0]T , we extend
the error quantity in (4) under steady-state conditions to:
LT [Idcref 1− LI′dc] = 0 (23)
where 1 is an identity matrix. Hence, (23) concludes that
the steady-state error created by the sensor fault is nullified
owing to the symmetric information exchange in the multi-
agent DC microgrid. As a result, the remaining agents share
the demand to regulate average voltage estimates to Vdcref
with the current of the faulted agent being zero. Hence, the
difference in the output currents between each agent can be
utilized as a sufficient criteria to detect current sensor fault in
ith agent using:
FDiI = u
I
i =
{
> ρFDi , if Idc 6= I′dc
< ρFDi , else
(24)
where ρFDi is a positive detection threshold used to avoid
Fig. 6. Performance of the fault detection metric for current sensor faults in
agent II – Positive FD2I confirms current sensor fault in agent II.
false detection by bypassing the noise in current measure-
ments. As shown in Fig. 6, when a current sensor of agent II
fails at t = 1 s, FD2I shoots to the positive region to confirm
that current sensor has failed in agent II. Further, when the
sensor is restored at t = 3.5 s, it can be seen that FD2I returns
back to zero. In other words, the microgrid operates with N−1
agents during current sensor fault, which imitates a similar
dynamic attribute when a converter is plugged out. However,
a distinguishing feature between both scenarios is that control
and communication of the plugged out converter is lost as
opposed to the case involving current sensor fault.
Remark V: It is worth mentioning that the control input of
the faulted agent in (22) should be disregarded when (24) is
positive to avoid any conflicts for detection of hijacking attacks
in other agents. It is intuitive that faulted sensors can’t be
further attacked, hence this corollary holds true.
Fig. 7. Performance of the fault detection metric for voltage sensor faults in
agent II – Positive FD2V confirms voltage sensor fault in agent II.
2) Voltage Sensor Fault: Considering a column matrix with
faulted voltage sensor in N th agent V′dc = [Vdc1 ,Vdc2 , ...., 0]T
and substituting in (17), the dynamics during a voltage sensor
fault in each controller can be written as:
LT V̇
′
dc = C
−1(NI′in − Idc) (25)
where I′in = [Iin1 ,Iin2 , ...., IinmaxN ]
T with IinmaxN as the
maximum input current of N th agent. As soon as voltage sen-
sor fails, the output of voltage controller shown in Fig. 5 will
ramp up to reach the maximum input current. This explains
the corresponding row entry for I′in due to the faulted voltage
sensor. Since a distributed voltage observer is employed, the
currents from remaining agents also increase/decrease to main-
tain power balance. This results into a disproprotionate per-
unit input current sharing. This asymmetry will be reflected in
the second term of RHS of (25) and can be used as a sufficient
criteria to confirm voltage sensor fault in ith agent using:
FDiV = −uIi =
{
> ρFDi , if Vdc 6= V′dc
< ρFDi , else
(26)
where FDiV is the failure detection metric for voltage sensor
in ith agent. A positive detection region has been consistently
used in this paper for all the malfunctioning events in DC
microgrids. Since the faulted voltage sensor of an agent
induces its output current to rise to the maximum value as
compared to the remaining agents, the control input uIi is
multiplied by a factor of -1 to fetch positive values of fault
detection. To test its performance, a voltage sensor fault is
conducted in agent II in Fig. 7 at t = 1 s. As soon as the sensor
fault occurs, the voltage reported in agent II immediately goes
to zero. Using the fault detection theory in (26), it can be
seen that FD2V rises into the positive region. Similar to
the current sensor fault scenario, the microgrid operates with
N−1 agents during voltage sensor fault. Hence, the proposed
detection criterias in (22), (24) and (26) impart precision and
interoperability to detect hijacking attack and sensor faults
separately. Moreover, they are simple to design which can be
readily done using the existing resources in distributed control
based DC microgrids. It is worth notifying that an evaluation
theory to discriminate between DC line-to-line faults and cyber
attacks is already studied in [33]. As a result, this provides
a composite evaluation and detection model to differentiate
various sorts of anomalies in the operation of DC microgrids.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed detection theory is tested on cyber-physical
DC microgrids with N= 4 agents, as shown in Fig. 2. Each
agent comprises of a DC source and a DC/DC boost converter
with equal power capacities. The output voltage of all buses
are regulated by a global reference Vdcref = 315 V. The
robustness of the proposed distributed screening based detec-
tion theory has been tested for symmetric hijacking attacks,
which goes undetected by the distributed voltage observer.
Furthermore, it is tested under multiple scenarios such as plug
and play of converter and communication delay to validate its
performance. In addition, a case study is presented to show
the performance of the failure detection metrics to differentiate
between sensor fault and hijacking attack. It should be noted
that each event in the abovementioned detection scenarios are
separated by a certain time-gap to provide clear understanding.
The simulation plant and control parameters are provided in
Appendix.
Referring to Fig. 8, the reliability of the proposed detection
strategy is examined when subjected to a maximum commu-
nication delay of 135 ms and 10% packet loss in the ring-
based cyber network. Since delay affects the performance
Fig. 8. Performance of cooperative agents in DC microgrids in the presence of maximum communication delay of 135 ms and 10% packet loss – Positive
DS3 indicates the presence of a symmetric attack in agent III.
Fig. 9. Performance of cooperative agents in DC microgrids during voltage sensor fault and plug-and-play of agent III – Positive DS3 for t = [4, 5] s
indicates the presence of a symmetric attack in agent III. Positive FD1V for t = [2, 2.15] s indicates a voltage sensor fault in agent I, thereby ensuring accurate
detection of the malfunctioning events.
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Fig. 10. Experimental setup comprising of three commercial DC/DC con-
verters connected in parallel to form a ring DC network.
of the distributed controller, the system operation is always
carried out within a borderline delay such that the convergence
is guaranteed using consensus theory [3]. Within the said
borderline delay range, the rate of convergence is directly
proportional to the communication delay. To test this theory,
a symmetric hijacking attack is carried out on agent III at t
= 1.5 s in Fig. 8. It can be seen that even with a slower rate
of convergence owing to the communication delay, a positive
value for DS3 confirms the presence of attack in agent III.
Hence, it can be concluded that the performance of proposed
detection scheme will remain unaffected by communication
delay as long as the convergence is reached to obey the system
objectives in (6).
In Fig. 9, the performance of the proposed detection scheme
is evaluated during a converter outage and restoration and
voltage sensor fault. When the voltage sensor in agent I fails at
t = 2 s, FD1V rises into the positive region thereby validating
(26) and goes to zero upon restoration of the sensor at t =
2.15 s. It can be seen that DS following some initial transient
does not indicate positive values during a sensor fault. Further
when agent III is plugged out at t = 4 s, the remaining active
agents share the load equally in terms of both input and output
currents. However, when a symmetric attack of xa1 = 2 A is
injected into agent I, even though output currents are shared
proportionately, DS1 rises into the positive region thereby
ensuring presence of attack elements in agent I. As already
mentioned in Section III, the communication and control is lost
for agent III, which restricts the calculation of DSi only for
active agents. This establishes that no conflict is encountered
while detecting sensor fault and hijacking attacks using the
proposed detection metrics in DC microgrids.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed detection strategy has been experimentally
validated in a DC microgrid with N = 3 agents, as shown in
Fig. 10. A single line diagram of the experimental setup is
shown in Fig. 11. To demonstrate the simplicity in design of
the proposed detection strategy, the experimental prototype is
carried out with three commercial DC/DC boost converters
[34] tied in parallel and form a physical ring-bus network
comprising of a programmable load at one of the buses. The
reference voltage for each converter can be varied in their
respective control units, as shown in Fig. 10. Each analog
measurement from each converter is communicated to their
neighboring control units using USB accompanying the Mod-
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Fig. 12. Experimental validation of the proposed DS based detection theory with input and output currents : (a) Symmetric hijacking attack on agent I during
plug in-and-out of agent II, and (b) Symmetric hijacking attack on agent I under a maximum communication delay of 80 ms. Positive DS for the attacked
agents [calculated using (22)] ensures the presence of attack element in the corresponding agents from A-B.
bus protocol to execute undirected distributed communication.
Using the local and neighboring measurements, the secondary
sublayer shown in Fig. 5 is modeled in the LabVIEW platform
to vary the voltage references for each agent to meet the
control objectives in (6) accordingly. It is worth notifying
that since the commercial DC/DC converters did not have
an acquisition channel, the experimental results have been
shown in terms of measurable quantities, which provides a
basic understanding of the proposed discordant theory. The
value of DS can be calculated using (22) in waveforms of
input currents with c = 1.2. In the following results, event A
depicts the instant where the false data is injected to initiate
the attack and event B depicts the instant where the attack is
removed. The experimental testbed parameters are provided in
Appendix.
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Fig. 13. Experimental validation of the proposed FDI metric to detect current
sensor fault in agent I : Positive FD1I [calculated using (24)] ensures the
current sensor fault in agent I.
In Fig. 12(a), the performance of the proposed detection
scheme is evaluated during a converter outage and restoration.
As soon as agent II is plugged out, the remaining active
agents share the load equally for both input and output
currents. However, when a symmetric hijacking attack of xa1
= 0.4 A is injected into agent I, the input currents of active
agents goes into disproportionate sharing despite the output
currents are shared proportionately. Using (22), DS2 goes
positive to denote the presence of symmetric attack elements in
agent I. This demonstrates that the proposed detection scheme
performs normally even under plug in-and-out of agents in
DC microgrids. Further in Fig. 12(b), when the output current
sensor in agent I is attacked with Iadc = 0.6 A during event A
under a maximum communication delay of 80 ms, the input
currents also follow a similar response as in Fig. 12(a). It
should be noted that the rise in DS1 into the positive region
takes some time, owing to the communication delay. Hence, it
can be concluded that the attack detection philosophy performs
normally under experimental conditions even in the presence
of communication delay.
In Fig. 13, the performance of the fault detection metric
for current sensor fault in agent I is examined. The fault is
emulated experimentally by replacing the measurement from
the acquisition channel with zero. As soon as the current
sensor fails, it can be seen that FD1I [calculated using (24)]
rises to a positive value immediately, thereby validating the
proposed fault detection theory.
VI. CONCLUSION
A novel distributed screening based detection strategy is
proposed for both symmetric and asymmetric hijacking at-
tacks. The system response for both hijacking attacks has
been demonstrated with a detailed explanation and theoretical
validation using the consensus theory in DC microgrids. Since
sensor faults also cause a similar arbitrary response to that of
hijacking attacks, an evaluation theory is proposed to assist the
proposed detection strategy to differentiate between hijacking
attack and sensor fault. This evaluation theory is quantified
using a fault detection metric for both voltage and current
sensors by conducting a detailed analysis. As a result, it
facilitates interoperability of detection and mitigation of both
events and avoid confusion. Another contribution is simplic-
ity of the detection scheme. Finally, the proposed detection
strategy has been validated experimentally under plug-and-
play of converters and communication delay to show the
robustness for any commercially available voltage controlled
DC/DC converters. This study can be an asset in many real
applications such as, telecommuniation centeres, electric ships
and aircrafts, renewable energy based systems, etc.
APPENDIX
The simulated system consists of four sources rated equally
for 5 kW. It is to be noted that the line parameter Rij is
connected from ith agent to jth agent. Moreover, the controller
gains are consistent for each agent.
Plant: R12 = 1.8 Ω, R14 = 1.3 Ω, R23 = 2.3 Ω, R43 = 2.1,
Lsei= 3 mH, Cdci= 250 µF, Idcmax = 16 A, Idcmin = 0 A,
Vdcmin = 270 V, Vdcmax = 385 V
Controller: Vdcref = 315 V, Idcref = 0, K
H1
P = 3, K
H1
I = 0.01,
KH2P = 4.5, K
H2
I = 0.32, GV P = 2.8, GV I = 12.8, GCP =
0.56, GCI = 21.8, Vin = 270 V, c = 3.24, ρFDi = 1.5, ρDSi
= 0.75.
Further, the experimental setup consists of three sources
with the converters rated equally for 1 kW. The controller
gains are consistent for each agent.
Plant: R12 = 0.6 Ω, R13 = 0.8 Ω, R23 = 0.75 Ω, Lsei= 2.5
mH, Cdci= 100 µF, Idcmax = 20 A, Idcmin = 0 A, Vdcmin =
44 V, Vdcmax = 52 V
Controller: Vdcref = 48 V, Idcref = 0, K
H1
P = 240.6, K
H1
I =
1.6, KH2P = 4.5, K
H1
I = 0.08, c = 1.2, ρFDi = 0.3, ρDSi =
0.25.
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